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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
These two cases present the issue of whether Utah Code Ann.,
Section 35-1-69(1)(b) (1953, as amended 1981) requires reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund to an employer who has paid
temporary total compensation and medical benefits if the worker's
compensation applicant's permanent physical impairment attribut-

able to the industrial injury is 10% or greater and the percentage
of permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and
conditions is greater than 20%.
STfrTE^EflT QF FACT?

Sweeney
1.

The Utah State Insurance Fund was the compensation

carrier for San Juan Pools on July 18, 1983, when a fiberglass
slide fell, hitting Mr. Sweeney on the head (R. 78-80, 97). The
injury resulted in the excision of a herniated cervical disc and a
fusion of the vertebrae (R. 98-117).
2.

Mr. Sweeney had been involved in numerous industrial and

non-industrial accidents prior to July 18, 1983, which resulted in
permanent bodily impairment (R. 49-78).
3.

Mr. Sweeney was rated by the independent medical panel as

having the following pre-existing permanent bodily impairment
prior to the accident of July 18, 1983:
a.

5% whole body impairment to the thoracic spine

(R. 828, 846);
b.

5% whole body impairment to the left hand and wrist

(R. 828, 846) ;
c.

20% whole body impairment to the left knee (R. 828,

846) .
Pursuant to the combined values chart, Mr. Sweeney's bodily
impairment prior to July 18, 1983 was 28% (R. 859)'.
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4.

The independent medical panel assigned a 20% whole body

impairment to the cervical spine injury resulting from the July
18, 1983 accident (R. 829).
5.

20% impairment of the 72% unimpaired man resulted in the

Utah State Insurance Fund being liable for 14.4% whole body
impairment

(the Administrative Law Judge rounded this to 15%)

(R. 849).
6.

The Utah State Industrial Commission required the State

Insurance Fund to pay Mr. Sweeney 15% permanent impairment.

It

also required the State Insurance Fund to pay all of the temporary
total compensation

and medical benefits resulting from the

July 18, 1983 accident without reimbursement from the Second
Injury Fund (R. 850-851, 887).

flaupin
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows:
1.

Mr. Maupin suffered injuries when he fell from a ladder

on June 16, 1982, while in the process of installing an air
conditioner on the roof of a house (R. 21-22, 821).
2.

As a result of Mr. Maupin's fall from the ladder, he was

determined by the independent medical panel to have the following
permanent physical impairments:
a.

5% permanent partial impairment for residuals of

sprain of the spine;
b.

15% loss of bodily function for psychiatric diffi-

culties resulting from the injuries;
c.

17% hearing loss in the right ear (R. 222, 223).
3

This totals 37% permanent bodily impairment caused by the
industrial accident.

However, when the Administrative Law Judge

used the combined values chart, the resulting physical impairment
was 33% (R. 304).
3.

In addition to the impairments that Mr* Maupin suffered

in his June 16, 1982 industrial accident, he had also lost or
permanently injured several fingers on his left hand in a nonindustrial accident that occurred in October of 1976 (R. 42-43) .
The independent medical panel rated these left hand deficiencies
as a 22% permanent partial impairment of the whole body,
4.

The Administrative Law Judge, in his Amended Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, found the employer and its
insurance carrier liable for 25.74% permanent partial impairment.
This was computed by determining the impact of a 33% impairment on
a 78% person (R. 304).
5.

The Administrative Law Judge required the employer and

its insurance carrier to pay Mr. Maupin the permanent partial
disability of 25.74% of the whole person, and required the Second
Injury Fund to pay Mr. Maupin 22% permanent physical disability of
the whole person (R. 305). The Administrative Law Judge, however,
denied the employer and its insurance carrier reimbursement from
the Second Injury Fund for medical benefits and temporary total
compensation which it had paid (R. 305-306).
6.

The Industrial Commission, in its denial of the employ-

er's Motion for Review, refused to allocate medical expenses and
temporary total compensation paid by the employer (R. 310-312).
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously and
in excess of its authority by failing to allocate temporary total
compensation and medical benefits between the employer and the
Second

Injury Fund, as required by Utah Code Ann., Section

35-1-69,

ARGUMENT
UTAH CODE ANN., SECTION 35-1-69(1)(b) REQUIRES
AN ALLOCATION OF TEMPORARY TOTAL COMPENSATION
AND MEDICAL BENEFITS IN BOTH OF THE CONSOLIDATED CASES HEREIN.
The clear language of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69(1)(b)
(see Attachment A) mandates that when combined disabilities are
determined, the industrial accident results in permanent physical
impairment of 10% or greater, and the injured party has permanent
physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions
greater than 20%, it is assumed that the industrial accident was
made substantially greater by the pre-existing condition, and an
allocation must be made to the Second Injury Fund.

That Section

requires the Second Injury Fund to reimburse the employer and
its insurance carrier for temporary total compensation and
medicals based on the percentage of permanent disability attributable to preexisting conditions.
Despite the numerous motions for review in both of these
cases, the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission
provided no reasoning for their failure to apply the statute as
written.

Such action by the Commission is arbitrary, capricious
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and beyond the scope of their authority, and must be reversed by
this Court.
This Court has consistently required that the Industrial
Commission allocate medical benefits and temporary total compensation between the Second Injury Fund and the employer based on the
percentage permanent partial impairment from pre-existing conditions bears to the applicant's total permanent physical impairment
attributable to all causes and conditions.

See McPhie v. United

States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504 (Utah 1976); IntegfflQUntain ffefrlth
Care, Inc. , v. Orteaa. 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977); American CPfll
Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984).
The Administrative Law Judge, in his Amended Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, relied on the case of Day's
Marked

lnq,f V, MyiJlr.r 669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), and cited the

following language:

The Fund's (Second Injury Fund) only applicat i o n i s where t h e c u r r e n t i n c a p a c i t y i s
s u b s t a n t i a l l y g r e a t e r than (the employee)
would have incurred if he had not had the
pre-existing incapacity.
This language
r e q u i r e s a f i n d i n g as to t h e e f f e c t the
p r e - e x i s t i n g i n c a p a c i t y had on the current
incapacity. The finding in the abstract as to
the t o t a l pre-existing incapacity is of l i t t l e
assistance in making t h i s determination, since
the full responsibility f a l l s upon the current
employer unless i t could be said t h a t the
c u r r e n t i n c a p a c i t y i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y greater
than i t would have been "but for" the preexisting incapacity.
This Court was i n t e r p r e t i n g the pre-1981 s t a t u t e in the Muir
case.

While the Administrative Law Judge accurately c i t e s from

that case, the language used stands for the proposition that the
6

Commission must make proper findings of fact in order to award
Second Injury Fund benefits.

In the 1981 amendment to Section 69,

however, the Legislature added a paragraph in which the term
"substantially greater" which is used in the first paragraph, is
defined:
For the purposes of this Section, (a) any
aggravation of a pre-existing injury, disease,
or congenital cause shall be deemed "substantially greater", and compensation, medical
care, and other related items shall be awarded
on the basis of combined injuries as provided
above; provided, however, that (b) where there
is no such aggravation, no award for combined
injuries shall be made unless the percentage
of permanent physical impairment attributable
to the industrial injury is 10% or greater and
the percentage of permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions,
including the industrial injury, is greater
than 20%,
This additional legislative language establishes two separate
circumstances under which the Commission must find that permanent
incapacity is substantially greater than the applicant would have
incurred if one of two conditions exist:

(a) there is an aggrava-

tion of a pre-existing injury; or (b) if the industrial injury is
10% or greater and the total physical impairment from all causes
and conditions is greater than 20%, While the Administrative Law
Judge was well instructed that he must make a finding of substantially greater in order to trigger Second Injury Fund benefits as
required by Dayfs Market. he is clearly required to make such a
finding

in both of the instant cases because in each case,

although the applicant suffered an injury by industrial accident
to areas of the body that were not previously incapacitated and
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thus the industrial injury did not constitute an aggravation, each
of the applicants suffered 10% or greater permanent incapacity as
a result of the industrial accident and had permanent physical
impairment in excess of 20% from all causes and conditions*
Clearly, the statutory trigger for "substantially greater" is met
in both of these cases.

When such occurs, the provisions of the

statute and provisions of this Court's prior cases requires that
the Administrative Law Judge allocate temporary total compensation
and medical benefits based on the combined disabilities*

American

CPAI CO» Y.

See

gan^stcQiBf supra.

In denying the motions for review in both of the consolidated
cases, the Industrial Commission failed to address the arguments
raised by the State Insurance Fund requesting application of the
provisions of the 1981 amendments to Section 69, and continued to
characterize the cases as cases where no aggravation occurred to a
pre-existing condition, a claim which the State Insurance Fund
clearly never made.

The rationale of the Commission's denials of

motions for review is that there would not be an allocation of
temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses where the
industrial accident did not act upon, change or in any way
increase the pre-existing condition.

The Commission clearly

ignores this Court's oft stated purpose underlying the Second
Injury Fund; that is, to encourage employers to hire previously
impaired individuals.
While Mr. Maupin's fall from the ladder did not directly harm
his previously impaired left hand, he clearly went from a 22%
8

impaired

person

to a 48% impaired person*

Likewise, while

Mr. Sweeney's rupture of the cervical disc did not act directly
upon his previously impaired knee or thoracic spine, he went from
a 28% impaired man to a 42% impaired man.

While it is absurd

for the Commission to ignore the direct statutory language, it
seems even more farcical that the Commission cannot find that each
of these men has permanent incapacity which is substantially
greater than they would have incurred if it had not been for their
pre-existing incapacity.

When such test is met either by meeting

the 10/20 Rule specified in the statute, or by the Industrial
Commission making the finding that permanent incapacity was made
substantially greater by a pre-existing

incapacity, Utah Code

Ann., Section 35-1-69 is clear that:
Compensation, medical care and other related
items as outlined in Section 35-1-81 shall be
awarded on the basis of the combined injuries,
but the liability of the employer for such
compensation, medical care, and other related
items shall be for the industrial injury only
and the remainder shall be paid out of
the Second Injury Fund provided for in Section
35-1-68(1).

CONCLUSION
Both of the applicants suffered industrial injuries that
resulted

in permanent

incapacities greater than 10%.

Each

applicant now has permanent incapacities in excess of 20% from all
causes and conditions.

The 1981 amendment to Utah Code Ann.,

Section 35-1-69, in paragraph (1)(b) requires the Commission to
find

that the applicant's

greater

incapacity was made substantially

due to the pre-existing conditions and to allocate
9

temporary total compensation and medical benefits between the
employer and the Second Injury Fund,
DATED this

:i_ day of April, 1985.
BLACK & MOORE
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ATTACHMENT A

.''»"»• I-i>'i. Combined i n j u r b s resulting in p e r m a n e n t inrapueily
Payment
>ut nf second injury fund - - T r a i n i n g of employee. (1) If any employee win
ias [)r«'\ io-isl; incurred a permanent incapacity hy accidental injury, disease, of
•••ng'-nital can ••-. -ost.ain- an industrial injury fur which either compensation or
nediral c a n \ « r both, is provided by this title that results in permanent incapacity
.vhich is substantially greater than he would have incurred if he had not had tin:
pre-existint: ir."apacity, or which aggravates or is aggravated hy such pre-existing
incapacity, enr i| "ligation, medical care, and other related items as outlined in section T~»-]-H. si-.aM he awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, hut the liability of the emj lover for such compensation, medical care, and other related item:;
shall he for the industrial injury only and the remainder shall he paid out of the
second injury Mind provided for in section .T)-|-bS (1).
For purpose; (if this section, (a) any aggravation of a pre-existing injury, disease.
r>r congenital c;\u>e shall be deemed "substantially greater", and compensation,
medical care, and other related items shall he awarded on the basis of the combined
injuries as pioudcd above; provided, however, that (b) where then* is no such
aggravation, no award for combined injuries shall be made unless the percentage
of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury is H)'.'?. or
greater and I he percentage of permanent physical impairment resulting from all
causes and conditions, including the industrial injury, is greater than 20V'.. Where
the pre-existing incapacity referred to in subsection (I) (b) of this section previously has been compensated for, in whole or in part, as a permanent partial disability under this act or the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, such
compensation shall be deducted from the liability assessed to the second injury
fund under this paragraph.
Where the payment of temporary disability benefits, medical expenses, or other
related items are required as a result of the industrial injury subject to this section, the employer or its insurance carrier shall be responsible for all such temporary benefits, medical care, or other related items up to the Q.m\ of the period of
temporary total disability resulting from the industrial injury. Any allocation of
disability benefits, medical care, or other related items following such period shall
he made between the employer or its insurer and the second injury fund as pro
vided for herein, and any payments made by the employer or its insurance carrier
in excess of its proportionate share shall he recoverable at the time of the award
for combined disabilities if any is made hereunder.
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medical panel set forth in section 35-2-.%, shall review all medical aspects of the case and determine first, the
total permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and condition
including the industrial injury; second, the percentage of permanent physical
impairment attributable to the industrial injury; and third, the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the previously existing condition or
conditions, whether due to accidental injury, disease or congenital causes. The
industrial commission shall then assess the liability for permanent partial disabil
ity compensation and future medical care to the employer on the basis of the pet
centage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injur;,
only and any amounts remaining to be paid hereunder shall be payable out of tin
second injury fund; provided, however, that medical expenses shall be paid in tin
first instance by the employer or its insurance carrier. Amounts, if any, which hav<
been paid by the employer in excess of the portion attributable to the said indti
trial injury shall be reimbursed to the employer out of the second injury fund upo»
written rcouest and verification of amounts so expended.
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